Essay about Peter Singer’s View Of Utilitarianism,Summary of Famine, Affluence and Morality
WebEthics in the Real World: 82 Brief Essays on Things That Matter () One World Now: The Ethics of Globalization () The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism WebEssay about Peter Singer’s View Of Utilitarianism “As I write this, in November , people are dying in East Bengal from lack of food, shelter, and medical care” Singer WebIn “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Peter Singer discusses that people are dying in Bengal from a lack of food, shelter, and medical care. Singer discusses in detail how WebPeter Singer, an Australian philosopher and professor at Princeton University asks his students the simple question of whether they would save a drowning child from a pond, WebDec 25, · Topic: Literature Words: Pages: 4 Dec 25th, In his article, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Peter Singer focuses on a topic that is essential for ... read more
This principle seems almost as uncontroversial as the last one. It requires us only to prevent what is bad, and to promote what is good, and it requires this of us only when we can do it without sacrificing anything that is, from the moral point of view, comparably important. I could even, as far as the application of my argument to the Bengal emergency is concerned, qualify the point so as to make it: if it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it.
An application of this principle would be as follows: if I am walking past a shallow pond and see a child drowning in it, I ought to wade in and pull the child out. This will mean getting my clothes muddy, but this is insignificant, while the death of the child would presumably be a very bad thing. The uncontroversial appearance of the principle just stated is deceptive. If it were acted upon, even in its qualified form, our lives, our society, and our world would be fundamentally changed. For the principle takes, firstly, no account of proximity or distance. It makes no moral difference whether the person I can help is a neighbor's child ten yards from me or a Bengali whose name I shall never know, ten thousand miles away.
Secondly, the principle makes no distinction between cases in which I am the only person who could possibly do anything and cases in which I am just one among millions in the same position. I do not think I need to say much in defense of the refusal to take proximity and distance into account. The fact that a person is physically near to us, so that we have personal contact with him, may make it more likely that we shall assist him, but this does not show that we ought to help him rather than another who happens to be further away. If we accept any principle of impartiality, universalizability, equality, or whatever, we cannot discriminate against someone merely because he is far away from us or we are far away from him.
Admittedly, it is possible that we are in a better position to judge what needs to be done to help a person near to us than one far away, and perhaps also to provide the assistance we judge to be necessary. If this were the case, it would be a reason for helping those near to us first. This may once have been a justification for being more concerned with the poor in one's town than with famine victims in India. Unfortunately for those who like to keep their moral responsibilities limited, instant communication and swift transportation have changed the situation. From the moral point of view, the development of the world into a "global village" has made an important, though still unrecognized, difference to our moral situation. Expert observers and supervisors, sent out by famine relief organizations or permanently stationed in famine-prone areas, can direct our aid to a refugee in Bengal almost as effectively as we could get it to someone in our own block.
There would seem, therefore, to be no possible justification for discriminating on geographical grounds. There may be a greater need to defend the second implication of my principle - that the fact that there are millions of other people in the same position, in respect to the Bengali refugees, as I am, does not make the situation significantly different from a situation in which I am the only person who can prevent something very bad from occurring. Again, of course, I admit that there is a psychological difference between the cases; one feels less guilty about doing nothing if one can point to others, similarly placed, who have also done nothing. Yet this can make no real difference to our moral obligations. Should I consider that I am less obliged to pull the drowning child out of the pond if on looking around I see other people, no further away than I am, who have also noticed the child but are doing nothing?
One has only to ask this question to see the absurdity of the view that numbers lessen obligation. It is a view that is an ideal excuse for inactivity; unfortunately most of the major evils - poverty, overpopulation, pollution - are problems in which everyone is almost equally involved. The view that numbers do make a difference can be made plausible if stated in this way: if everyone in circumstances like mine gave £5 to the Bengal Relief Fund, there would be enough to provide food, shelter, and medical care for the refugees; there is no reason why I should give more than anyone else in the same circumstances as I am; therefore I have no obligation to give more than £5. Each premise in this argument is true, and the argument looks sound.
It may convince us, unless we notice that it is based on a hypothetical premise, although the conclusion is not stated hypothetically. The argument would be sound if the conclusion were: if everyone in circumstances like mine were to give £5, I would have no obligation to give more than £5. If the conclusion were so stated, however, it would be obvious that the argument has no bearing on a situation in which it is not the case that everyone else gives £5. This, of course, is the actual situation. It is more or less certain that not everyone in circumstances like mine will give £5. So there will not be enough to provide the needed food, shelter, and medical care.
Therefore by giving more than £5 I will prevent more suffering than I would if I gave just £5. It might be thought that this argument has an absurd consequence. Since the situation appears to be that very few people are likely to give substantial amounts, it follows that I and everyone else in similar circumstances ought to give as much as possible, that is, at least up to the point at which by giving more one would begin to cause serious suffering for oneself and one's dependents - perhaps even beyond this point to the point of marginal utility, at which by giving more one would cause oneself and one's dependents as much suffering as one would prevent in Bengal.
If everyone does this, however, there will be more than can be used for the benefit of the refugees, and some of the sacrifice will have been unnecessary. Thus, if everyone does what he ought to do, the result will not be as good as it would be if everyone did a little less than he ought to do, or if only some do all that they ought to do. The paradox here arises only if we assume that the actions in question - sending money to the relief funds - are performed more or less simultaneously, and are also unexpected. For if it is to be expected that everyone is going to contribute something, then clearly each is not obliged to give as much as he would have been obliged to had others not been giving too.
And if everyone is not acting more or less simultaneously, then those giving later will know how much more is needed, and will have no obligation to give more than is necessary to reach this amount. To say this is not to deny the principle that people in the same circumstances have the same obligations, but to point out that the fact that others have given, or may be expected to give, is a relevant circumstance: those giving after it has become known that many others are giving and those giving before are not in the same circumstances. So the seemingly absurd consequence of the principle I have put forward can occur only if people are in error about the actual circumstances - that is, if they think they are giving when others are not, but in fact they are giving when others are.
The result of everyone doing what he really ought to do cannot be worse than the result of everyone doing less than he ought to do, although the result of everyone doing what he reasonably believes he ought to do could be. If my argument so far has been sound, neither our distance from a preventable evil nor the number of other people who, in respect to that evil, are in the same situation as we are, lessens our obligation to mitigate or prevent that evil. I shall therefore take as established the principle I asserted earlier. As I have already said, I need to assert it only in its qualified form: if it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything else morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it.
The outcome of this argument is that our traditional moral categories are upset. The traditional distinction between duty and charity cannot be drawn, or at least, not in the place we normally draw it. Giving money to the Bengal Relief Fund is regarded as an act of charity in our society. The bodies which collect money are known as "charities. The charitable man may be praised, but the man who is not charitable is not condemned. People do not feel in any way ashamed or guilty about spending money on new clothes or a new car instead of giving it to famine relief. Indeed, the alternative does not occur to them. This way of looking at the matter cannot be justified. When we buy new clothes not to keep ourselves warm but to look "well-dressed" we are not providing for any important need.
We would not be sacrificing anything significant if we were to continue to wear our old clothes, and give the money to famine relief. By doing so, we would be preventing another person from starving. It follows from what I have said earlier that we ought to give money away, rather than spend it on clothes which we do not need to keep us warm. To do so is not charitable, or generous. Nor is it the kind of act which philosophers and theologians have called "supererogatory" - an act which it would be good to do, but not wrong not to do. On the contrary, we ought to give the money away, and it is wrong not to do so.
I am not maintaining that there are no acts which are charitable, or that there are no acts which it would be good to do but not wrong not to do. It may be possible to redraw the distinction between duty and charity in some other place. All I am arguing here is that the present way of drawing the distinction, which makes it an act of charity for a man living at the level of affluence which most people in the "developed nations" enjoy to give money to save someone else from starvation, cannot be supported. It is beyond the scope of my argument to consider whether the distinction should be redrawn or abolished altogether. There would be many other possible ways of drawing the distinction - for instance, one might decide that it is good to make other people as happy as possible, but not wrong not to do so.
Despite the limited nature of the revision in our moral conceptual scheme which I am proposing, the revision would, given the extent of both affluence and famine in the world today, have radical implications. These implications may lead to further objections, distinct from those I have already considered. I shall discuss two of these. One objection to the position I have taken might be simply that it is too drastic a revision of our moral scheme. People do not ordinarily judge in the way I have suggested they should. Most people reserve their moral condemnation for those who violate some moral norm, such as the norm against taking another person's property.
They do not condemn those who indulge in luxury instead of giving to famine relief. But given that I did not set out to present a morally neutral description of the way people make moral judgments, the way people do in fact judge has nothing to do with the validity of my conclusion. My conclusion follows from the principle which I advanced earlier, and unless that principle is rejected, or the arguments are shown to be unsound, I think the conclusion must stand, however strange it appears. It might, nevertheless, be interesting to consider why our society, and most other societies, do judge differently from the way I have suggested they should. In a wellknown article, J. Urmson suggests that the imperatives of duty, which tell us what we must do, as distinct from what it would be good to do but not wrong not to do, function so as to prohibit behavior that is intolerable if men are to live together in society.
Moral attitudes are shaped by the needs of society, and no doubt society needs people who will observe the rules that make social existence tolerable. From the point of view of a particular society, it is essential to prevent violations of norms against killing, stealing, and so on. It is quite inessential, however, to help people outside one's own society. If this is an explanation of our common distinction between duty and supererogation, however, it is not a justification of it. The moral point of view requires us to look beyond the interests of our own society. Previously, as I have already mentioned, this may hardly have been feasible, but it is quite feasible now. From the moral point of view, the prevention of the starvation of millions of people outside our society must be considered at least as pressing as the upholding of property norms within our society.
It has been argued by some writers, among them Sidgwick and Urmson, that we need to have a basic moral code which is not too far beyond the capacities of the ordinary man, for otherwise there will be a general breakdown of compliance with the moral code. Crudely stated, this argument suggests that if we tell people that they ought to refrain from murder and give everything they do not really need to famine relief, they will do neither, whereas if we tell them that they ought to refrain from murder and that it is good to give to famine relief but not wrong not to do so, they will at least refrain from murder.
The issue here is: Where should we draw the line between conduct that is required and conduct that is good although not required, so as to get the best possible result? This would seem to be an empirical question, although a very difficult one. One objection to the Sidgwick-Urmson line of argument is that it takes insufficient account of the effect that moral standards can have on the decisions we make. Given a society in which a wealthy man who gives 5 percent of his income to famine relief is regarded as most generous, it is not surprising that a proposal that we all ought to give away half our incomes will be thought to be absurdly unrealistic. In a society which held that no man should have more than enough while others have less than they need, such a proposal might seem narrow-minded.
What it is possible for a man to do and what he is likely to do are both, I think, very greatly influenced by what people around him are doing and expecting him to do. In any case, the possibility that by spreading the idea that we ought to be doing very much more than we are to relieve famine we shall bring about a general breakdown of moral behavior seems remote. If the stakes are an end to widespread starvation, it is worth the risk. Finally, it should be emphasized that these considerations are relevant only to the issue of what we should require from others, and not to what we ourselves ought to do. The second objection to my attack on the present distinction between duty and charity is one which has from time to time been made against utilitarianism.
It follows from some forms of utilitarian theory that we all ought, morally, to be working full time to increase the balance of happiness over misery. The position I have taken here would not lead to this conclusion in all circumstances, for if there were no bad occurrences that we could prevent without sacrificing something of comparable moral importance, my argument would have no application. Given the present conditions in many parts of the world, however, it does follow from my argument that we ought, morally, to be working full time to relieve great suffering of the sort that occurs as a result of famine or other disasters. Of course, mitigating circumstances can be adduced - for instance, that if we wear ourselves out through overwork, we shall be less effective than we would otherwise have been.
Nevertheless, when all considerations of this sort have been taken into account, the conclusion remains: we ought to be preventing as much suffering as we can without sacrificing something else of comparable moral importance. This conclusion is one which we may be reluctant to face. I cannot see, though, why it should be regarded as a criticism of the position for which I have argued, rather than a criticism of our ordinary standards of behavior. Since most people are self-interested to some degree, very few of us are likely to do everything that we ought to do. It would, however, hardly be honest to take this as evidence that it is not the case that we ought to do it.
It may still be thought that my conclusions are so wildly out of line with what everyone else thinks and has always thought that there must be something wrong with the argument somewhere. In order to show that my conclusions, while certainly contrary to contemporary Western moral standards, would not have seemed so extraordinary at other times and in other places, I would like to quote a passage from a writer not normally thought of as a way-out radical, Thomas Aquinas. Now, according to the natural order instituted by divine providence, material goods are provided for the satisfaction of human needs. Therefore the division and appropriation of property, which proceeds from human law, must not hinder the satisfaction of man's necessity from such goods.
Equally, whatever a man has in superabundance is owed, of natural right, to the poor for their sustenance. So Ambrosius says, and it is also to be found in the Decretum Gratiani: "The bread which you withhold belongs to the hungry; the clothing you shut away, to the naked; and the money you bury in the earth is the redemption and freedom of the penniless. I now want to consider a number of points, more practical than philosophical, which are relevant to the application of the moral conclusion we have reached. These points challenge not the idea that we ought to be doing all we can to prevent starvation, but the idea that giving away a great deal of money is the best means to this end. It is sometimes said that overseas aid should be a government responsibility, and that therefore one ought not to give to privately run charities.
Giving privately, it is said, allows the government and the noncontributing members of society to escape their responsibilities. This argument seems to assume that the more people there are who give to privately organized famine relief funds, the less likely it is that the government will take over full responsibility for such aid. This assumption is unsupported, and does not strike me as at all plausible. The opposite view - that if no one gives voluntarily, a government will assume that its citizens are uninterested in famine relief and would not wish to be forced into giving aid - seems more plausible. In any case, unless there were a definite probability that by refusing to give one would be helping to bring about massive government assistance, people who do refuse to make voluntary contributions are refusing to prevent a certain amount of suffering without being able to point to any tangible beneficial consequence of their refusal.
So the onus of showing how their refusal will bring about government action is on those who refuse to give. I do not, of course, want to dispute the contention that governments of affluent nations should be giving many times the amount of genuine, no-strings-attached aid that they are giving now. I agree, too, that giving privately is not enough, and that we ought to be campaigning actively for entirely new standards for both public and private contributions to famine relief. Indeed, I would sympathize with someone who thought that campaigning was more important than giving oneself, although I doubt whether preaching what one does not practice would be very effective. Unfortunately, for many people the idea that "it's the government's responsibility" is a reason for not giving which does not appear to entail any political action either.
Another, more serious reason for not giving to famine relief funds is that until there is effective population control, relieving famine merely postpones starvation. If we save the Bengal refugees now, others, perhaps the children of these refugees, will face starvation in a few years' time. In support of this, one may cite the now well-known facts about the population explosion and the relatively limited scope for expanded production. This point, like the previous one, is an argument against relieving suffering that is happening now, because of a belief about what might happen in the future; it is unlike the previous point in that very good evidence can be adduced in support of this belief about the future.
I will not go into the evidence here. I accept that the earth cannot support indefinitely a population rising at the present rate. This certainly poses a problem for anyone who thinks it important to prevent famine. Again, however, one could accept the argument without drawing the conclusion that it absolves one from any obligation to do anything to prevent famine. The conclusion that should be drawn is that the best means of preventing famine, in the long run, is population control. It would then follow from the position reached earlier that one ought to be doing all one can to promote population control unless one held that all forms of population control were wrong in themselves, or would have significantly bad consequences. Continue reading this essay Continue reading. Toggle navigation MegaEssays.
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Essay Examples. Pojman Peter Singer is an ethical and political philosophy that is well known for his founding movement of modern animal rights. Peter Singer Moreover, he believed that people who are suffering from lack of resources are morally bad, in this case Bengal. Besides, it is in our power to prevent something bad from occurring. Pojman In East Bengal, when the civil war broke out, it created more than nine million refugees. Singer believes that mankind controls poverty and their suffering is not inevitable. Also, government conflicts cause more damage than they believe; the battlefront for war can also be home for many. Wars between countries can cause significant damage but countries do not even aid for the land they destroyed or even give back to the poor.
Pojman Overall, no government has given enough aid to support such a large amount of refugees just to survive another couple days. A great example is India; the country has to choose between life and death. India needs so much money that they will be forced either to aid the poor or let the refugee starve to death, but at some point there will be more poor people in India. Pojman People all over the world who are able to give and support the poor must stop situations like these. Thus, this proves to me that the world is fighting with itself. Nations go into war because of one simple reason; he killed one of us. The why and How of Effective Altruism This has shown us that poverty is not just meant to be, but was created from a man-made cause. In order for this world to be successful, it must work together and sacrifice for the greater good.
Singer has a common view on ending immense evil, he believes that everyone has a duty to perform and that is to give to charity. People should donate until it affects their own standard of living. In order to that, one must stop spending money on unneeded goods and donate to the poor for great causes such as preventing diseases. Pojman Singer mentioned two different scenarios and how we react to them but instead of muddy clothes, let assume the individual has fifty-dollar shoes. So the first case, an individual with fifty-dollar shoes witnesses a girl drowning and chose to ruin their shoes to save her. That is because since there was a physical connection and such minimum time on his or her hands, he was forced to take upon the role to save her.
On the other hand, a similar girl in Africa who needs a vaccine shot to survive and you have an extra fifty dollars that can save her, so you decided to not donate the money but buy extra shoes. Pojman To put it another way, the man knew he would not suffer from any mental pain or witness her dying. Therefore, the man did not care and chose to buy his shoes since society has altered his mindset. Although, at times people who have suffered some type of poverty or even drowning understand the concept and are willing to help others. The second case, a group of people witnesses a girl drowning but after some thought the individual still saved the girl and destroyed his shoes.
To clarify, the individuals did not know what to do because they depended on each other to safe her from drowning. In like manner, people in society feel less guilty about famine because they are depending on the elites to donate and help the poor. In contrast, a girl in Africa is suffering and you have an extra fifty dollars but they mentally put the responsibility on the wealthy and bought some extra shoes. For both examples, they both show differences on how people act upon situations either alone or with others and how they measure their opportunity cost.
But, Singer believes that there is a psychological difference between the two cases in our society. But, in a situation like a girl drowning, people are forced to act upon because of the closer connection between the two. In fact, Singer wants society to understand that its okay to lose some of their assets to help the needy. To conclude, Singer is concerned to the claim that one must give until it would hurt you more than help others. But, that is not necessarily the only interest that matters and it is most definitely not the most important interest on Earth.
Moreover, utilitarianism is a moral theory that says right actions are those that result in the most beneficial balance of good over bad consequences for everyone involved. Therefore, if everyone on Earth was to convert to a utilitarian where people must act against their own interest and be willing to do more good than bad. However, you can do more good by choosing to spend your day cleaning your neighborhood or having a movie night with family. In general, most of major evils; poverty, overpopulation, and pollution are common problems that everyone should be willing to help and avoid them.
Pojman Therefore, if the world comes to an agreement into paying small amounts, like five dollars every six months, then organizations would have billions of dollars to support and prevent people from entering poverty. Moreover, for issues such as overpopulation, countries can set certain limits on population or land usage. Third, pollution has been an issue for centuries, and the only way to slow it down is by cutting down on unneeded materials and give back to the needy. Singer proposed two different principles on changing the world , a stronger argument he supports, and a weaker argument as his backup plan.
For example, a individual who goes to the movies every weekend and spends forty dollars on a ticket and food. But, instead of going to the movies they can use that fund to donate to the poor. Therefore, a portion of their monthly income will go into the needy rather than themselves. On the other hand, his weak version would change how we view our responsibilities to the poor. In addition, this version states that we can prevent something bad from happening without sacrificing anything morally significant. Pojman In short, for both principles, society must measure the difference between responsibility and charity because it can bring people together and help for a great cause.
Indeed, while famine does not affect an individual directly, people should make it our life-long duty to help and support people all around the world. An individual will disagree with me because their perspective of giving might be different which is very rare I believe. Also, those who might disagree might not be mentally developed to understand this is not a overnight job but it will take time and understanding. As a child, I would wonder why are their poor people in the world and are people born homeless?
Peter Singer has opened me new doors and helped me recognize that we are the cause of everything good or bad on this earth. Moreover, giving to the needy is not as simple as it seems, we must break our mental barrier and make this world a better place. Sol ask myself, in a dilemma, how much would I be willing to sacrifice for people in poverty? Essays Find a Tutor. APA MLA Harvard Vancouver Essay Examples. April Copy to Clipboard Reference Copied to Clipboard. History and Development of St.
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WebIn “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Peter Singer discusses that people are dying in Bengal from a lack of food, shelter, and medical care. Singer discusses in detail how WebPeter Singer’s article, “Speciesism and the Equality of Animals,” claims that human beings should apply the principle of equal consideration of interests to nonhuman beings as well WebDec 25, · Topic: Literature Words: Pages: 4 Dec 25th, In his article, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Peter Singer focuses on a topic that is essential for WebMay 30, · Singer argues it is wrong for a person to suffer from homelessness, hunger, or lack of medical attention. These needs are essential in life and without them can WebPeter Singer, an Australian philosopher and professor at Princeton University asks his students the simple question of whether they would save a drowning child from a pond, WebTo understand Peter Singer and his work, it's helpful to examine his views on animal rights, euthanasia, and charity. Peter Singer is an Australian utilitarian philosopher and is a ... read more
This would seem to be an empirical question, although a very difficult one. So I tried to get around the need to produce a complete ethical theory by allowing my readers to fill in their own version - within limits - of what is morally significant, and then see what the moral consequences are. In reviewing this article I find that Singer was concerned with the wellbeing of others when it comes to food, shelter, and medical care, and the lack of these things that are essential to our daily activities. Singer challenges the reader to question the common intuition that physical distance and the means of using money reduces our moral obligation to help others. We have a strong moral intuition that the life of a child is worth far more than the cost of our iPhone.
It is used for. Effective Altruism Global. Lucy from Glennview High and Peter Singer make strong points on each side of peter singer essay fence. This may once have been a justification for being more concerned with the poor in one's town than with famine victims in India. But, instead of going to the movies they can use that fund to donate to the poor. On a more philosophical level, peter singer essay, there has been some discussion of the original article which has been helpful in clarifying the issues and pointing to the areas in which more work on the argument is needed. Then he leaves his readers with premises to the conclusion of his argument.
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